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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is to investigate and demonstrate the application of a systems
approach to medical device safety in China. Professor Leveson has developed an
accident modeling framework called STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling
and Processes.) Traditional accident models typically focus on component failure; in
contrast, STAMP includes interactions between components as well as social,
economic, and legal factors.
In this thesis, the accident of the artificial heart at a level II hospital in China was
used as a test case to study whether Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) is
used to outline the interactions between the different medical device system
components, identify the safety control structure in place, and understand how this
control structure failed to prevent artificial heart accident in a Chinese hospital.
The analysis suggested that further changes might be necessary to protect the Chinese
public and so, based on the results of the CAST, a new set of systemic
recommendations was proposed.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Qi D Van Eikema Hommes
Title: Research Scientist of Engineering Systems Division
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1 Introduction
In a systems approach to safety, the focus is on eliminating or mitigating hazards
through appropriate system design and operations. Rather than focusing on adverse
events after they occur, emphasis is instead placed on system modeling and analysis
and building safety into the system design. While a systems approach to safety does
include investigating accidents (adverse events) when they occur, hazard analysis is
used to investigate an accident or adverse event before it happens. The results of the
modeling and analysis are used to proactively identify causal factors and take steps to
eliminate or control them. Such modeling and analysis must include identifying the
unintended consequences of system designs [7].
With the development of technology, medical device system is becoming more
complex; relationship between human and automation are also becoming more
complex. These changes are leading to more system errors. As a result, traditional
systems engineering approaches that focus on an individual component failure as the
root cause of accidents or issues may not be applicable anymore.
Because of the complexity of healthcare systems, standard systems engineering
approaches that focus on individual component failure as the cause of accidents or
losses are not easily applicable. A new approach to system safety engineering is
therefore necessary. Here safety is treated instead as a dynamic control problem that
considers the entire socio-technical system under which it operates. This new model
of accident causality, called STAMP (System-Theoretical Accident Model and
Process), is capable of handling much more complex systems than traditional safety
engineering methods based on simpler, more limited assumptions about causality.
This thesis intends to demonstrate the practicality of this new approach to modeling
and designing improved medical device safety which entails determining whether it is
possible to model and analyze the organizational and social dynamics behind a major
failure of the system. An artificial heart product was chosen as the example not only
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because of the severity of the problems but also because this case included a large
number of the factors involved in such losses.
This thesis contains 6 Chapter. Section 1 is a rapid introduction. Chapter 2 introduces
the background of medical devices in China and an artificial heart product accident.
Chapter 3 presents some safety design tools that are popularly used in medical device
design. Chapter 4 provides a background of System Safety Engineering and a new
model called System-Theoretical Accident Model and Process (STAMP). Chapter 5
constitutes the STAMP analysis. It represents the core of the STAMP analysis with an
analysis of the safety control structure and a detailed analysis of the different
components in the system. Chapter 6 outlines a new set of policy recommendations
2 Background Information on China Medical Devices and
Artificial Heart Accident
2.1 Growing China Market
Because of its recent economic growth and social development, China is already the
third largest medical device market in the world, after the United States and Japan.
Within 5 to 7 years, China will surpass Japan and become the second largest medical
device market in the world. It's projected to grow from USD 10 billion in 2007 to
USD 15.5 billion in 2012. Medical devices and medical drugs are the two major
means of health care. The ratio of sales of medical devices and drugs in developed
countries is about 1:1, while in China it is only 1:10 [8]. Figure 1 shows the fast
growth of the China medical device market.
9
SUMMARY FIGURE
CURRENT CONSUMPTION AND FORECAST
FOR MEDICAL EQUIPMENT THROUGH 2012
($ MILLIONS)
3,600
3.000
U 2,500
- 2.000
G 1.500
1.000
500
0-
2005 2006 2007 2012
" Imaging diagnostic equipment
" Clinical diagnostic laboratory instrument
Patient monitoring equipment
Source: BCC Research
Figure 1- Current Consumption and Forecast for Medical Equipment
Before year 2002, more than 80 percent of China's 700 million rural residents lack
health insurance [8]. In addition to, only a small number of citizens can afford
standard Western medical care. Ongoing medical reforms are designed to expand the
number of the insured. Up until 2011, the basic health insurance has covered more
than 12.8 billion Chinese. Meanwhile, the new Healthcare Reform Plan is expected to
result in a growing demand for new hospitals and CDCs. More than 400 new hospitals
are expected to be built annually in the coming years, and even more are expected to
be built, rebuilt, or expand at the country level in the next ten years [8]. Township
health centers will also receive more attention to upgrade their facilities and devices.
With its growing and aging population, demands on China's health care system have
ballooned in recent years. Growing prosperity and changing dietary habits mean that
more and more Chinese are confronted with the same health issues that plague
patients in developed nations. Chinese traditional medicine cannot deliver technology
to afford diagnosis and treatment. Increasingly, patients are seeking out advanced
medical techniques to treat these illnesses and there is a heavy reliance on Western
technology for treatments. Therefore, during 2004 - 2007, the annual growth rate of
China's medical device was 23%, and the imports rose from USD 3.1 billion to USD
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4.3 billion with annual increase of 12%. Over 80% of high-tech medical equipment
relies on imports [8].
The major buyers of the medical equipment are hospitals, urban and rural health
centers, and Centers of Disease Control (CDCs). Averages of 322 new hospitals were
built each year during 1990 - 2007. This number is expected to go up to 400 annually
in the next 10 years. About 30% of total investment in these new hospitals is used for
purchasing of medical device [8]. The key customers of imported equipment are large
hospitals, the vast majority of which are state-run.
While there are more than 20,000 hospitals in China, only the most advanced ones
(less than 1,000 Level III and possibly some of the 5,000 Level II) are able to afford
foreign technology, they are also wary of the "made in China" label and continue to
demand foreign brands when considering treatment. Foreign companies, especially
large medical device manufacturers from Japan, Germany, and the USA, still have a
comparative advantage in terms of technology and presently control more than half of
the high-end device market. Chinese consumers also trust Western medical device
brands over domestic ones and are willing to pay 20% more for them because they
believe them to be more reliable and less likely to malfunction [8].
2.2 Artificial Heart Event
However, along with the increasing medical device market, the number of adverse
events is increasing too. The artificial heart was a typical high-technical product that
should be applied to heart disease area. This thesis intended to analyze a real case in
China, but the real names of the product, hospital, and all stakeholders are not
presented in this thesis.
In April 2004, a teenager was undergoing a surgery to install an artificial heart
product by a foreign doctor A at a level II hospital in China. A local doctor B provided
the treatment plan and made decision to suggest the teenager to take heart surgery. 15
months later, this hospital announced the teenager was dead because of Systemic
organ failure death in July 2005. And according the public information from this
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hospital, the same artificial heart product had been installed to total 9 patients from
2001. The investigation found that 7 of them had died within 15 months.
In June 2007, the State Food and Drug Administration had confirmed that there was
no record in their product catalog, which meant the artificial heart was not legal in
China. And the surgeon, who installed artificial heart to most of patient, was a foreign
doctor from a Europe. The regulation has defined that the foreign doctors must get
approval from the Ministry of Health before they provide health service in China. The
local health bureau had confirmed they did not issue a license for the doctor B. That
meant the doctor was not legal to provide diagnosis and treatment service in China.
According to investigation hold by former SFDA officer, the main contributor to the
artificial heart event was the hospital. However, a few questions can be asked. Why
could unregistered medical device product be used in the hospital? Why could an
illegal doctor take surgeries in the hospital?
The research question that this thesis intends to answer is:
Can Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST) provide more insights to the causes
of these medical device accidents?
3 Literature Review
To investigate and analyze the cause of an accident and prevent further losses, and
assess the risk associated with using the systems and products, researchers have
developed many methods through the system design (model) for states or conditions
that could lead to system hazards. According to my past experience, there are some
methods used widely in the medical device product design process in China, such as
FMEA, FTA, ETA, and CCA.
3.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was developed in the 1950s, and applied
to medical device industry since the 1970s. FMEA is a procedure in product
development and operations management for analysis of potential failure modes
within a system for classification by the severity and likelihood of the failures. Failure
modes are any errors or defects in a process, design, or item, especially those that
affect the customer, and can be potential or actual. Effects analysis refers to studying
the consequences of those failures [10].
FMEA activity can help a team to identify potential failure modes based on past
experience with similar products or processes, enabling the team to design those
failures out of the system with the minimum effort and resource expenditure, thereby
reducing development time and costs [10]. It is widely used in manufacturing
industries in various phases of the product life cycle. A general FMEA has 10 steps as
figure 2 below. A basic FMEA by Robin is shown below in Figure 3.
Figure 2-Ten steps for an FMEA
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Step I Review the process or product.
Step 2 Brainstorm potential failure modes.
Step 3 List potential effects of each failure mode.
Step 4 Assign a severity ranking for each effect.
Step 5 Assign an occurrence ranking for each failure mode.
Step 6 Assign a detection ranking for each failure mode and/or effect.
Step 7 Calculate the risk priority number for each effect.
Step 8 Prioritize the failure modes for action.
Step 9 Take action to eliminate or reduce the high-risk failure modes.
Step 10 Calculate the resulting RPN as the failure modes are reduced
or eliminated.
Figure 3-Afaple ofw~u FMEAk
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Since the effectiveness of FMEA is dependent on the members of the committee
which examines product failures, it is limited by their experience of previous failures.
FMEA is only part of a larger system of quality control. Used as a bottom up tool,
FMEA may only identify major failure modes in a system. It is not able to discover
complex failure modes involving multiple failures within a subsystem, or to report
expected failure intervals of particular failure modes up to the upper level subsystem
or system.
3.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault tree analysis (FTA) was developed originally in 1961 for Minuteman based on
converging chains-of-events accident model. FTA is a top down, deductive failure
analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analyzed using Boolean Logic to
show specific combinations of identified basic events sufficient to cause the undesired
top event (hazard) on a complex system [11]. This analysis method is mainly used in
the field of safety engineering and reliability engineering to determine the probability
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of a safety accident or a particular system level (functional) failure. Its graphical
format can help in understanding system and relationship between events.
The analyst begins with an incident or undesirable event that is to be avoided and
identifies the immediate causes of that event. Each of the immediate causes (called
fault events) is further examined in the same manner until the analyst has identified
the basic causes of each fault event or reaches the boundary established for the
analysis [11]. The resulting fault tree model displays the logical relationships between
basic events and the selected Top event. Figure 3 shows an example of FTA.
Figure 4-Example fault tree structure
Compared with failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), which is an inductive,
bottom-up analysis method aimed at analyzing the effects of single component or
function failures on equipment or subsystems. FTA is very good at showing how
resistant a system is to single or multiple initiating faults. But it is not good at finding
all possible initiating faults. FMEA is good at exhaustively cataloging initiating faults,
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and identifying their local effects. It is not good at examining multiple failures or their
effects at a system level. FTA considers external events, FMEA does not [12].
As mentioned previously, complex system fail due to both component random
failures and undesirable components interactions. Merely focus on component
reliability does not ensure safety [20] Building safer systems requires going beyond
the usual focus on components failure and reliability to focus on system hazards and
eliminating or reducing their occurrence. This fact has important implications to
analyzing and designing for safety. Bottom-up reliability engineering analysis
techniques, such as FMEA, are not appropriate for safety analysis. Even top-down
techniques, such as FTA, if they focus on component failure, are not adequate [19].
3.3 Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
An event tree analysis (ETA) is an inductive procedure that shows all possible
outcomes resulting from an accidental (initiating) event, taking into account whether
installed safety barriers are functioning or not, and additional events and factors [12].
By studying all relevant accidental events (that have been identified by a preliminary
hazard analysis, a HAZOP, or some other technique), the ETA can be used to identify
all potential accident scenarios and sequences in a complex system. Design and
procedural weaknesses can be identified, and probabilities of the various outcomes
from an accidental event can be determined.
The results of the ETA are event sequences; that is, sets of failures or errors that lead
to an incident. An Event Tree Analysis is well suited for analyzing complex processes
that have several layers of safety systems or emergency procedures in place to
respond to specific initiating events. Figure 4 is an example for ETA.
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Figure 5-Event Tree Analysis example
The results of an Event Tree Analysis are the event tree models and the safety system
successes or failures that lead to. each defined outcome. Event sequences depicted in
an event tree represent logical AND combinations of events; thus, these sequences
can be put into the form of a fault tree model for further qualitative analysis. Analysts
use these results to identify design and procedural weaknesses, and normally provide
recommendations for reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of the analyzed
potential incidents. The ETA can visualize event chains following an accidental event
and barriers and sequence of activation; it's better at identifying and simplifying event
scenarios; it's useful for evaluating the need for new or improved procedures and
safety functions.
The problem is that there is no standard for the graphical representation of the event
tree, and only one initiating event can be studied in each analysis. If the events are out
of order and not independent of each other, the ETA cannot work. It's difficult to
analyze and represent interactions among those events. And because of the simplicity,
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it's easy to overlook subtle system dependencies, and not well suited for handling
common cause failures in the quantitative analyses [19].
3.4 Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA)
A Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) is a generalization of the most widely spread
safety analysis techniques: FMEA and FTA. Generally, CCA can be applicable to the
physical systems, with or without human operators. A major strength of a Cause-
Consequence Analysis is its use as a communication tool. The cause consequence
diagram displays the relationships between the incident outcomes (consequences) and
their basic causes [12]. This technique is most commonly used when the failure logic
of the analyzed incidents is rather simple, since the graphical form, which combines
both fault trees and event trees on the same diagram, can become quite detailed.
CCA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as a cause-consequence diagram. The
purpose of CCA is to determine whether the initiating event will develop into a
serious mishap, or if the event is sufficiently controlled by the safety systems and
procedures implemented in the system design. With the probabilities of the various
events in the CCA diagram, the probabilities of the various consequences can be
calculated, thus establishing the risk level of the system. Figure 5 below shows a
typical CCA.
18
Cause-Consequence Uncontrolled
Diagram reaction
Valve Computer
failure does not
critical event Pressure too high open
Relief valve 1
opens?
Yes No
Vle OperatVle does n
failure open
Relief valve 2
opens?
Yes Nooe
Pressure Exlso
reduced Exlso
Figure 6-An example of CCA
The CCA technique is a method of risk assessment that provides a means of
graphically displaying interrelationships between consequences and their caus. Safety
design features that are intended to arrest accident sequences are accounted in the
CCA. But CCA was based on converging chain-of-events model again, it can analyze
for only a single event, multiple CCA will be required to evaluate the consequence of
multiple initiating events [20]. Additionally, the analysis process requires an analyst
with some training and practical experience, otherwise the diagrams can become
unwieldy.
3.5 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
A hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) is a technique for identifying and
analyzing hazards and operational concerns of a system. It is very organized,
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structured, and methodical process for carrying out a hazard identification analysis of
a system, from the concept phase through decommissioning [12].
The HAZOP technique was initially developed in the early 1970s by Imperial
Chemical Industries Ltd. to analyze chemical process systems, but has later been
extended to other types of systems and also to complex operations and to software
systems. It is a qualitative technique based on guide-words and is carried out by a
multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of meetings.
HAZOP can be defined as the application of a formal systematic critical examination
of the process and engineering intentions of new or existing facilities to assess the
hazard potential that arise from deviation in design specifications and the
consequential effects on the facilities as a whole.
This technique is usually performed using a set of guidewords: NO/NOT, MORE
OR/LESS OF, AS WELL AS, PART OF REVERSE, AND OTHER THAN. From
these guidewords, scenarios that may result in a hazard or an operational problem is
identified. Consider the possible flow problems in a process line, the guide word
MORE OF will correspond to high flow rate, while that for LESS THAN, low flow
rate.
The consequences of the hazard and measures to reduce the frequency with which the
hazard will occur are then discussed. This technique had gained wide acceptance in
the process industries as an effective tool for safety and operability improvements.
Figure 6 gives an HAZOP example.
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Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Possible Consequences
NONE No flow 1. Pump failure 1. Overheating in heat
2. Pump suction exchanger.
filter blocked 2. Loss of feed to reactor.
3. Pump isolation
valve closed.
Figure 7-An example of HAZOP
The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out as early in the design phase as
possible - to have influence on the design. As a compromise, the HAZOP is usually
carried out as a final check when the detailed design has been completed. A HAZOP
study may also be conducted on an existing facility to identify modifications that
should be implemented to reduce risk and operability problems.
As a systematic examination, HAZOP is easy to learn and perform. The analysis
doesn't require considerable technical expertise for technique application. HAZOP
analysis can also provide rigor for focusing on system elements and hazards. But it
focuses on single event rather than combinations of possible events. And the guide
words may lead the analysis to overlook some hazards not related to a guide word
[20]. Additionally, HAZOP analysis requires experienced team leader and members,
because the analysis may divert to endless discussions of details that wastes too much
time.
3.6 Summary
All models are abstractions; they simplify the thing being modeled by abstracting
away what are assumed to irrelevant details and focusing on the features of the
phenomenon that are judged to be the most relevant. Selecting some factors as
relevant and others as irrelevant is, in most cases, arbitrary and entirely the choice of
the modeler. That choice, however, is critical in determining the usefulness and
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accuracy of the model in predicting future events. Accidents models impose patterns
on accidents and cause is ascribed to an accident, the countermeasures taken to
prevent future accidents, and the evaluation of the risk in operating a system, the
power and features of the accident model used will greatly affect our ability to
identify and control hazards and thus prevent accidents [20].
4 Introduction to System Safety Engineering
4.1 System Safety Definition in this thesis
This section is an introduction to system safety engineering. First the vocabulary
required to understand this paper is defined followed by a description of the model
used for the analysis. The following definitions are adapted from professor Leveson's
book.
Safety vocabulary
Safety: Safety is defined as the absence of loss due to an undesirable event (accident).
Accidents: An accident is defined as "an undesired and unplanned event that results
in a loss (including loss of human life or injury, property damage, environmental
pollution, etc.)".
Incidents: Incidents are defined as events not leading to an unacceptable loss but that
could have under other circumstances ("near-miss").
Hazards: Hazards are defined as "a system state or set of conditions that, together
with a particular set of worst-case environment conditions, will lead to an accident
(loss)".
Safety Control Structure: The control structure is the web of individuals and
organizations (government agencies, companies, individuals ...) whose purpose is to
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enforce safety related constraints. This control structure is typically embedded in an
adaptive socio-technical system.
Controllers: The controllers are all the agents that are part of the control structure
and who "control" the safety of the system through their actions.
STAMP: As discussed in the introduction, STAMP (System-Theoretical Accident
Model and Process) is a model of accident causality based on systems theory and
systems thinking and is capable of handling complex systems problems. In STAMP,
safety is treated as an emergent property that results from the enforcement (through
system design and operation) of safety related constraints on the behavior of the
system components. Accidents or losses result from unsafe interactions among
humans, machines or physical devices, and the environment. Losses are the result of
complex processes, including indirect and feedback relationships, rather than simply
chains of directly-related failure events (the typical model used to understand
causality).
4.2 STAMP Framework
Three basic constructs underlie STAMP accident model: safety constraints,
hierarchical safety control structures, and process models.
The most basic concept in STAMP is constraint. In order to provide the level of
system safety demanded by society today, we firstly need to identify the system
constraints to enforce and then to design effective control to enforce them.
The hierarchical safety control structure is the core of the STAMP accident causality
model [20]. This model includes two basic hierarchical control structures, one
illustrating the system development process (on the left) while the other represents the
system operations (on the right), with interaction between them. Communication may
be needed between the two structures. Figure 7 shows a generic example of a
hierarchical safety control structure.
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Figure 8-General Socio-Technical Safety Control Structure
Between hierarchical level of each safety control structure effective communication
channel are needed. There is a downward channel and an upward feedback channel:
The downward provide the information necessary to impose safety constraints on the
level below, and the channels represent the ability of one controller to assert its
authority and influence over another controller; the feedback channels updates the
controller's model of the process it is controlling and shows that how effectively the
constraints are being satisfied. Every controller contains a model of the state of the
process it is controlling and assumptions about how the controlled process behaves.
For human controllers, this is referred to as a mental model [20]. The communications
channels between control levels like figure 9.
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SYSTEM OPERATIONSI
Goats, Policies,
LEVEL N+1 Constraints
Control Commands
Reference Measuring
Channel Channel(Feedback)
LEVEL N OperationalExperience
Figure 9-Communications channels between control levels
The third concept in STAMP is process model, which is an important part of control
theory. Any controller needs a model of the process being controlled to control it
effectively. Process model can help to understand why accidents happened and design
safer systems. Components interaction accidents can usually be explained in terms of
incorrect process model. Figure 10 shows a general process model.
Controller
Process
Model
Control Feedback
Actions
Controlled Process
Figure 10-Accidents can occur when the controller's process model does not match the system
being controlled and the controller issues unsafe commands
4.3 CAST introduction
Most of accidents reports are written from the perspective of an even-based model.
They almost always clearly describe the events and usually one or several of these
events are chosen as "root cause(s)." The analysis often stopped at here, the "root
cause(s)" always was described as human operator error. Opportunity to learn
important lessons is lost. An approach to accidents analysis, based on STAMP, called
CAST (Causal Analysis based on STAMP), is used in following analysis. It provides
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the ability to examine the entire social-technical system design to identify the
weakness in the existing safety control structure. One goal of CAST is to get away
from assigning blame and instead to shift the focus to why the accidents occurred and
how to prevent similar losses in the future [20].
The STAMP based risk analysis process used in this thesis can be defined in
following steps [20]:
1) Identify the system and hazards.
2) Identify system safety constraints and system requirements.
3) Model the safety control structure, discover the main controller, and map the
feedback and control channels.
4) Estimate the proximate events leading up to the accident.
5) Analyze the losses at the physical system level.
6) Moving up the levels of the safety control structure, determine how and why
each successive higher level allowed or contributed to inadequate control at
the current level.
7) Examine overall coordination and communication contributors to the loss.
8) Determine the dynamics and changes in the system and the safety control
structure relating to the loss and any weakening of the safety control structure
overtime.
9) Generate recommendations.
In general, the description of the role of each component in the control structure
includes the following:
1) Safety requirements and constraints
2) Controls
3) Context:
" Roles and responsibilities
" Environmental and behavior-sharping factors
4) Dysfunctional interaction, failures, and flawed decisions leading to erroneous
control actions
5) Reasons for the flawed control actions and dysfunctional interactions
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" Control algorithm flaws
" Incorrect process or interface models
" Inadequate coordination or communication among multiple controllers
" Reference channel flaws
" Feedback flaws
The next section mainly focuses on the artificial heart event analysis.
5 Case Study by Using System Safety Engineering
Approach
5.1 Event Chains of Artificial Heart
The direct events leading to the death are:
1) A foreign doctor A brought the artificial heart to a Chinese hospital X.
2) A teenage boy moved into hospital X at April 2004, because of primary
cardiomyopathy and heart failure.
3) A doctor B worked at hospital X diagnosed the teenager and said he might die
within 1 day.
4) The Doctor B suggested taking a surgery to install the artificial heart.
5) The parents of the teenager trusted the doctor and agreed to take surgery.
6) The foreign doctor A and local doctor B were in charge of the surgery at April
2004.
7) The surgery that installed artificial heart seemed successful.
8) The teenager felt uncomfortable, the hospital X provide additional two
surgeries to treat the teenager between April 2004 and July 2005. Both of
them failed recover the teenager.
9) The doctor B at hospital X suggested taking cardiac transplantation surgery.
10) This cardiac transplantation surgery failed.
11) The teenager died at July 30 2005.
27
The information above can be found on Chinese media. People blamed the doctor A
and B. It seems to be an operator issue. The following content intends to analyze this
case again, to see whether deep insight can be found from a social level system.
5.2 System and Hazards Analysis
In this case, the system is social technical system for medical device.
A clear definition of what is considered accidents and incidents is key to any STAMP
analysis since preventing or mitigating them is the ultimate goal of the analysis. In
this thesis, accident is identified for medical device:
Al: Patients are injured or killed when accepting artificial heart transplant.
According to the investigation report, 9 patients were installed this type artificial heart
from 2001 to 2004. 7 patients had died with 2 years since they installed the artificial
heart. But the hospital stated that the successful rate of this surgery was 90%.
In the healthcare field, as in most other domains, it is impossible to reach a totally
"safe" state. The goal then is to reduce hazards, which are the events and states that
can lead to an accident. In medical device "safe" can be interpreted as having an
acceptable risk/benefit profile for a device with respect to a specific population.
For medical device products, the system-level hazards can be defined as following:
Hi: The artificial heart is not approved for safe use by the SFDA.
H2: The doctor is not qualified to make the surgery.
The effects of this hazard can be magnified in the case of popular medical devices
which a large part of the population is treated with. However, there may be other
hazards in the system, this thesis only intends to focus these two hazards.
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5.3 System Safety Constraints and Requirements
From this hazard, a set of system constraints and requirements can be derived. In
system engineering, the requirements may not be totally achievable in any practical
design. For one thing, they may be conflicting among themselves or with other system
(non-safety) constraints. The goal is to design a system (or to evaluate and improve an
existing system) that satisfies the requirements as much as possible today and to
continually improve the design over time using feedback and new scientific and
engineering advances. Tradeoffs that must be made in the design process are carefully
evaluated and revisited when necessary.
Some constraints and requirements emerged from the hazards outlined above. The
constraint and requirements are deemed necessary to ensure patient safety during the
development and subsequent diagnosis and treatment of medical devices.
Hi: The artificial heart is not approved for safe use by the SFDA.
SCJ: The artificial heart must be safe for clinical usage.
SRI: The artificial heart must get approval from the SFDA.
H2: The doctor is not qualified to make the surgery.
SC2: The diagnosis and treatment service must be provided by qualified doctor who
has license from Ministry of Health.
SR2: The doctor must follow the rules in China.
The main risks in this system are HI and H2. SCI and SC2 can provide general
constraints to artificial heart, and the detailed constraints can be extended in further
study. This thesis discusses the accident from social level, so the technical discussion
can be done in further study.
5.4 Safety Control Structure
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Now that the accident, the hazards and the requirements have been defined, it is
important to study the system itself, identify the different controllers who have a role
to play regarding safety and specify how they interact with each other. The first step
in studying the system is to identify the hierarchical safety control structure relevant
for this system.
30
Legislation
People's Congress I------ State Council
Government Report i Work report; accident report
GovermentLegislations,
departments 'lnnn .I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ministry of Health Ministry of Human Resource
and Social Security
I------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------
Work report;
Planning; guidelines; Work reort
budget; regulation, lawsaccident report
FI I2,lw
SFDA
Guidelines
Commissioners
I Wo rk report
A A
+ +
National Institute for Department of Medical Bureau of Investigation Center for Medical I
Food and Drug Control Device Supervision & Enforcement Device Evaluation
Technical reports t Technical reports
Application technical review Application technical review
Certificate; Technical Approval;
application review punishment;
technical I Reports supervision New product applications,Iadverse 
report
Product testing reports;
equipment repair Requirements and specifications
Evaluation-------Medical Device
Suppliers
Organizations Companies
lest application
-
Approval i i Private Hospital
- Adverse events
dical Buy medical device application - - - - - - -
ertising Diagnosis, Symptoms;
atio sing treatment i side effects
lation Advertising
adverseleven advertisement; Adverse events; public pressure
Media
Adverse events Patients
- - - - - - - - Information Channels Medical insurance
Control Channels
Figure 11-Social System Safety Control Structure
31
Devices and parts
Medical device, Buy product,
operation manuals, report accident,
service request service Supervision,
Funds; healthcare reform
* punishment
planning; approval- - - - -------
Public Hospital
Reqestiunds; buy medical device application
Mec
devi
adv
regu
This control structure shows that the medical device safety is enforced by a very
complex and interconnected system. Three main controllers (the SFDA, Medical
device companies, Healthcare Providers) compose the core of the system and a
variety of smaller controllers play a peripheral role in medical device safety (State
Council, evaluation organization, media, etc.)
Those controllers are interrelated and their interactions are of two types: control and
information. The control allows one controller to impose safety requirements on
another. For example, healthcare providers control patient's access to medical device
through diagnosis and treatment. The information serves as feedback mechanism:
patients can report the side effects when they are taking the treatment.
In this safety control structure, each of the safety requirements is enforced by at least
one controller. But, if each of the controllers relies on the others to monitor the
medical device safety, issues can go unmonitored. In addition, the assignment of
responsibilities does not mean that they are effectively carried out.
Once the responsibilities for each of the controllers has been identified, the controllers
can be analyzed independently to see whether the context they work in allows them to
properly fulfill their safety responsibilities and if they have the resources and
information they need to enforce the safety constraints they have been assigned.
Controller operation has three primary parts: control inputs, control algorithms, and
process model [20]. Inadequate, ineffective, or missing control actions can lead to
system failures. Figure below from professor Leveson's book established several
classifications of control loop deficiencies that could lead hazards.
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5.5 Physical Process Failure and Dysfunctional Interactions
From the event chains, the artificial heart case seems a normal death of a failed
surgery. Every surgery has risk, in particularly the heart relating surgery. However,
the investigation hold by former SFDA officer found some abnormal activities:
1) China Customers mentioned that the foreign doctor A brought the artificial
heart into China, but he didn't report this item to them when he got through
customers.
2) The hospital X said the Success rate of surgery was 90%.
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3) The doctor B might provide inadequate diagnosis and treatment suggestions to
teenager's parents, because another teenager had same situation but didn't take
artificial heart surgery was alive.
4) The foreign doctor A was not legal to be a doctor in China because he didn't
get approval from local Health Bureau.
5) The doctor B might provide inadequate treatment to teenager after artificial
heart surgery.
6) After the death of the teenager. His parents claimed that the hospital X could
waive part of fees around hundreds of thousands of RMB if they could sign a
special contract that required them couldn't report the details of treatment to
governments, media, and judiciary. But hospital X denied they have done this.
7) The SFDA mentioned they didn't issue a certificate to the artificial heart.
8) The hospital X claimed that the artificial heart used on teenager was imported
at 1998. The regulation for medical device was established at 2000. Therefore,
the artificial heart didn't violate the regulation.
9) The hospital X didn't have permission to take pediatric surgery and pediatric
cardiothoracic surgery.
10) The hospital X claimed that they had gotten permission at 2004 from Shanghai
Health Bureau. So the surgery for teenager was legal. But the date they got
permission was later than the date of surgery.
11) Investigation found the hospital X had installed this kind of artificial heart to
total 9 patients since 2001. 7 of them had died within 2 years.
As a common investigation, it stopped here and gave very good root causes why this
accident occurred. Examining the higher levels of control is necessary to obtain the
information to prevent future occurrences.
5.6 Analysis of the Hierarchical Safety Control System Controllers
The safety control structure gives a big picture to show the interactions between each
controller. In this section, not all control loops are analyzed. The analysis intends to
start from the control loops directly relating to the artificial heart accident from
bottom to up. The higher level control loops require investigating politics and culture
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background which was too complex in China. Additional studies can be taken in
future.
5.6.1 Hospitals and Patients Loop
The hospitals directly control the patients, including that provide diagnosis and
treatment service. The patients can only give feedback information and pay service
fees to the hospitals. The responsibilities of hospitals and patients are first described,
followed by the context in which their decision and actions took place. Then the
inadequate control actions are outlined and the factors that led to them are described.
Finally, the dysfunctional interactions and reason why the inadequate control
happened at this level of the control structure are analyzed.
Hospital
General Information:
A hospital is a healthcare institution that provides diagnosis and treatment for patients
by specialized staff and equipment. In China, the healthcare providers include public
hospital, private hospital, urban and rural health center, and CDC. The public
hospitals are first choice of most of Chinese.
The public hospitals are usually funded by the government, and the private hospitals
often funded by themselves. But all healthcare providers should get approval from the
Ministry of Health firstly. Historically, the public hospitals provide traditional
Chinese Medicine to patients, and operate few traditional Chinese medical devices.
Today, more than more hospitals are offering Western Medicine, and have largely
professional physicians, surgeons, nurses, and high-technical medical devices.
Roles and responsibilities:
The hospitals should follow Chinese regulations
First of all, the hospital should follow Chinese regulations for health. The legal
hospitals must get approval from the Ministry of Health (MOH), every section that
provides diagnosis and treatment service in the hospital should have registered at the
MOH. The hospital cannot provide service they do not registers. For example, the
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hospital could not take heart surgery if it does not have a record at the MOH, even if
the hospital has heart disease professionals.
The hospital is expected to provide safe healthcare service to patient.
The patient needs safety when accepting diagnosis and treatment. Medical devices are
used in these processes. Generally, a medical device is imposed on human body
directly. Firstly, the hospital should buy legal medical device product that has a legal
certificate from the SFDA [1]. For some special medical devices, the hospital needs to
submit application to the MOH to get approval.
Secondly, the hospital is expected to recruit qualified professionals. The doctors
should be professional and have a legal license from the MOH. It's the doctor's
responsibility to make treatment decisions based on the best interests of their patients,
that they will weigh the risks of treatment and non-treatment.
Finally, hospitals are expected to monitor the long term health of their patients and
report potential adverse events or negative interactions to the medical device
manufacturers.
Context in Which Decisions Were Made:
Health resource and funds pressure
The population was too large in China. Although the MOH had allocated a lot of
funds and health resources to the hospitals, it's difficult to meet the increasing
patient's needs. The distribution of resources might not reasonable in some areas.
Most of level III hospitals in urban areas could get more resource than rural areas
because of some special reasons. Additionally, the Chinese always believed that level
III could provide better diagnosis and treatment service, even if the prices were much
higher. Therefore, most of Chinese preferred to accept treatment at level III hospitals.
Actually, it's true that the level III hospitals could provide good healthcare service,
but they were located at big cities and there are more patients than small counties.
Many patients from rural areas will go to level III hospitals if they get some critical
disease that the level I hospital can't handle. Their visiting increase the pressure of
level III hospitals, so that hospitals have to require more and more funds and
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resources from the MOH, then they can hire better doctors, buy better medical devices,
and provide better healthcare service, to increasing patients. At the same time, their
doctors were notoriously busy and their time was limited, so that they had to work
intensively and overtime, which might result some risks. Rather, the level I hospitals
could not get enough resource to develop.
The hospital trusted medical device company
As doctors, they mostly learnt about new products from the medical device companies
themselves. Many medical devices were new to Chinese, so the doctors always
trusted information from the manufacturers, in particular the western companies, they
believed the western brands have better quality and effectiveness. Furthermore, the
patients were too much to the doctors didn't have enough time on studies of new
medical devices, so their operations might violate the right instruction.
The hospital tried to improve reputation and grade.
The hospital X was a level II hospital, and looking forward to upgrading to level III
hospital. One criterion of promotion was the hospital had its strengths, for example,
the artificial heart surgery had low successful rate in China, if the hospital could
complete a couple of successful artificial heart surgeries, then its reputation could be
increased a lot.
As a leader at hospital X, doctor B was responsible for the promotion of hospital,
which could bring higher position, income and personal reputation. Certainly, the
promotion meant more resource and funds to hospital. Doctor B had some foreign
background at Europe and U.S. He had some connections with many western medical
device research institutions and companies. So he could buy some new products from
Europe. And as a Chinese professional, he knew the regulations and standards had
some defects.
Patients
Roles and Responsibilities:
Patient should know effectiveness and side effect of diagnosis and treatment provided
by hospital.
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The patients are the ones most directly affected by the risks and benefits of the
medical device: they benefited from the diagnosis and treatment provided by medical
devices but might also have suffered from an adverse event related to the use of the
medical device. Patients are expected to take care of their own health, which entails
seeing a doctor when they feel ill and maintain a healthy lifestyle. In some cases,
patient access to a medical device is limited and the medical device has to be provided
by a doctor. They have right to know why should they take such treatments and what
is the effectiveness and side effect. Once patients feel uncomfortable or abnormal
when accepting treatment, they should report to the doctors immediately.
Context in Which Decisions Were Made:
Patient trusted hospital and did not care the side effect.
Because only a small part of Chinese had received college education, patients didn't
have professional medical knowledge, so they always trusted what doctors said in
some big hospitals, especially the high level hospitals. Generally, patients might
follow everything the doctors suggested and not question the doctor, for example,
took unnecessary diagnosis and treatment. In addition, the Chinese patient only
focused on the effectiveness of the treatment, few of them might know to ask the side
effect.
The medical insurance could afford not the expense of critical diseases.
Another Chinese characteristic was the large population. The medical insurance was
provided by China government. However, China was a developing country, although
the government had provided medical insurance to cover over 12.8 billion Chinese,
the compensation was not enough to cover the treatment fees of some critical illness.
Many patients could not afford huge service fees. They might accept the treatment
plan if hospitals could waive some fees.
Dysfunctional Interaction at this level:
Communication between hospital and patients was completely dysfunctional. The
hospital hid critical information that might be harmful to the patients and patients did
not ask the effectiveness and side effect of the artificial heart surgery.
Flawed or Inadequate Decision and Control Actions:
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Hospital
The hospital provided unnecessary diagnosis and treatment plan.
In a competitive environment, where doctors have to fight to keep their clientele, it is
easy to imagine how doctors might cave under the pressure and provide an
unnecessary treatment service.
Firstly, according to the investigation reports, for every patient, the doctor B provided
exaggerated diagnosis result, and suggested an unnecessary treatment to them for
purpose. Obviously, his treatment plans were contradictory with his diagnosis. But the
patients did not have medical knowledge to know if they should take surgery to install
an artificial heart. Patients had to follow doctor's suggestions.
The hospital conducted surgery that they did not get approval.
Secondly, doctor B didn't inform the patients that hospital X did not have approval to
conducted pediatric surgery. The record in local health bureau showed the hospital got
approval at July 21 2004. But the investigation showed total 9 surgeries were done
between 2001 and 2004, all of them were taken before approval.
The hospital used illegal artificial heart
The SFDA had confirmed the artificial heart was a product had not a legal certificate
from them. According to the investigation, the hospital could not explain how they
got the artificial heart. The investigation showed the artificial heart that applied to the
teenager was took by the foreign doctor A. And before this one, the hospital bought
artificial heart from a Chinese medical device company which disappeared at 2001.
The hospital did not tell the patients that the product was an illegal product, they just
told the patients this artificial heart had been successful used in the Europe with a
high successful rate.
The hospital allowed illegal foreign doctors to provide medical service.
Furthermore, the doctor B allowed the foreign doctor A to take surgery for patients.
The surgery reports showed that the foreign doctor A was the primary surgeon. But
according to the Chinese laws, foreign doctor can only provide medical services after
they get permission from health bureau.
The hospital did not stop illegal activities.
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In addition, the hospital X didn't stop the surgeries when they found some patients
had died after took artificial heart surgeries. The hospital also didn't provide incentive
to encourage its staff to report inadequate actions done by some doctors.
The hospital did not report accident.
Finally, the hospital X tried to pay money or compensation to some patients who had
died after heart surgery. The deal was the families of patients could not report the
surgeries to public and government.
Patients
Patients did not insist on their right.
The patients had rights to know the effectiveness and side effect of diagnosis and
treatment provided by hospital. But few of them asked for the details, they just
followed the suggestions from the doctors.
Reason for Flawed Control Action and Dys functional Interaction
Incorrect Metal Model:
The hospital X believed that artificial heart was safe, in particular the medical device
company that manufactured the heart had mentioned the product had been applied
widely and successfully in Europe. Like many Chinese hospitals, the hospital X
believed that western brand had higher quality and effectiveness. And the doctors
believed that expensive medical device was much better and safer than cheap medical
device. Of course they could charge higher service fee and get more money, so the
doctors recommended unnecessary but expensive diagnosis and treatment. The
investigation found that the total healthcare service fee for this teenager was more
than 600,000 RMB. Same as this teenager, other patients who had taken this surgery
were charged a lot.
The hospitals also typically believed that information provided by manufacturer was
accurate. However, the manufacturer always described their products better than they
are. Additionally, the hospitals believed that patients might go to another hospital if
they did not provide expensive and high technical treatment plan. Chinese patients
always require expensive treatment because they believed that was much better than
cheap one
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Finally, the hospital always believed that patients did not understand their treatment.
They believed that patients trusted everything they did was good to them. Even if they
did something wrong. And the patient could not know the diagnosis and treatment
was not necessary. The hospital told the patients that every surgery had risk. So the
patients died, the hospital explained that was a normal failure.
Patients
The Chinese patients believed that the higher level hospitals could provide better
treatment service. Also they believed higher price of the service, the better
effectiveness of the service. The patients also believed what the doctors provided
were right for their health. Few of them might question the doctors what they were
doing, and why did they do that.
5.6.2 Medical Device Company and Hospital Loop
General Information:
A medical device company is in charge of the medical device research &
development, manufacturing, sales and service. Currently, the medical device
company in China can be defined two types: domestic medical device company and
foreign medical device company. The main providers in mainland are foreign
companies, in particularly the western companies, like GE, Philips, and Siemens.
Western companies provide more than 70% high technical medical device products.
The Chinese healthcare providers, especially public hospitals, trust western brands
more than domestic brands. They believed western companies can deliver better
technology.
Role and Responsibilities:
The safety requirements and constraints imposed on medical device company extend
from the pre-approval phase, where the company is expected to be researching new
medical device, to post-approval requirements such as conducting more studies to
look for long-term side effects. Those safety responsibilities are organized in four
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major sections believed to cover the major safety requirements imposed on medical
device company.
Ensure that patients are protected from avoidable risks
Manufacturers are expected to provide safe and effective medical device. Patients are
exposed to medical device when they accepting diagnosis and treatment. Firstly, the
medical device company should meet regulation requirements provided by the State
Council, the MOH, the SFDA and other governmental departments. The company
should have strict internal quality and safety control process to ensure that the product
is safe and effective as its description. And because some risks may be difficult to
find in house, the company should provide long-term safety monitoring system to
ensure the safety of the patients and avoid their exposure to unnecessary and
preventable risk after the product is used on patients.
Additionally, the company is expected to provide operation manuals and training to
medical device operators. According to the statistics from SFDA report at year 2010,
the risk is mainly from operation issue. Therefore, it's important to ensure that the
operator is working on right way, which should reduce a lot adverse events. It's
medical device company's responsibility to edit properly operation manuals and
provide training to operators. Furthermore, the company should learn operator's
behaviors and design product to prevent unsafe operation, because some operators
may not follow operation manuals and result patient injury.
Monitor medical device for safety
After medical devices are on the market, the companies are expected to keep on
monitoring their products for long term side effects. After a medical device has been
approved, it is the responsibility of the medical device companies to run the studies in
a timely manner and report to the SFDA annually on the progress of their post-
marketing commitment. For example, the company should do a post-marketing study
to gather more information about whether the product is safety, efficacy or optimal
use, and decide whether the product needs to a design change to prevent hazards.
Furthermore, the medical device company should encourage customers and its
employees to report adverse events, the company should try to investigate that hazard
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and conduct new studies to solve trouble, even if it is expensive for the firm. Similarly,
if new risks are discovered during studies run by the companies, it is expected that
they should share this information with the SFDA, even if the results are negative.
The disclosure of negative results goes against the company's business interest but it
would be considered unethical for a company to conceal health risks associated with a
medical device. Therefore, the company must recall or remove a dangerous product
from market to protect the patients.
Give accurate and up-to-date product information to SFDA and customers
As mentioned above, the medical device company should provide all available
information about the safety of the product to the SFDA, so that SFDA can decide
whether issue the registration certificate, and check the product in the market
regularly. Secondly, the information must be reliable and traceable. Unlike the SFDA,
customers do not have techniques and resources to assess if the product is safe or not.
They have to trust and follow information the company provides.
Develop the products to eliminate potential hazards
Medical device companies are constantly innovating, finding treatments for new
diseases or improving on the existing treatments to limit their side effects.
Context in Which Decisions Were Made
The medical device company was profit-oriented
The company has a fiduciary duty to shareholders to provide a return on their
investment and stakeholders demand a high return. Furthermore, medical device
company executives are partly paid in stock options and therefore have strong
incentives to return a high profit. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the China medical
device market is extremely competitive now, especially for the domestic companies,
because according to the survey [8], Chinese consumers would like to trust large
western medical device brands over domestic ones and are willing to pay 20% more
for them. The reason is that Chinese consumers believe the large western medical
device companies have a comparative advantage in terms of technology and service.
They believe them to be more reliable and less likely to malfunction. As a result,
many domestic companies cannot get satisfied return.
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The medical device company delivered unsafe products when regulations system was
developing in China
And as mentioned previously, the regulation system in China has few defects and
needs optimization. However, because of complex and special situation in China, it's
difficulty to build a perfect regulation and supervision system in a short term. Thus, a
few domestic and many small western medical device companies developed some
products that may be dangerous for patients. These products will not be recalled or
removed unless accident happened, because they did not violate the current
regulations. Even if the products violated the regulations, the SFDA might not find
the illegal activities. So the companies can get better profit return.
As a result, both domestic and western medical device companies have no incentive
to do extra safety testing. The goal of running business is profit, extra testing
activities always cost more money and human resource, and the product will be
delayed to release to customers. Similarly, they have no incentives to publish negative
internal studies, which may reduce the profit, and band's reputation.
Dvs functional Interaction at this level:
In this case, the investigation report did not provide clear description about the deal
between medical device company and hospital. The Europe medical device company
refused to answer any question from China. So the author has to analyze the
inadequate control actions based on known information.
Flawed or Inadequate Decision and Control Actions:
The medical device company exported product to a Chinese hospital without SFDA
license. The goal was to do illegal clinical test in China, because the clinical test was
complex, expensive and long time in the Europe.
For profit-oriented company, time is money. As discussed earlier in the previous
section, medical device companies need to make a profit and generate revenues for
their stakeholders. Their activities were motivated by marketing goals. The company
always speeded up the product design and development process to enter market
earlier. So it did not run some necessary tests and studies that might find its product to
be dangerous. Such tests and studies are costly and risky, especially for some
developed market, it costs a lot of money to do tests, for example, the clinical test.
44
The artificial heart is a product that requires clinical test in China if the foreign
product wants to enter China market [3]. And the registration process is much longer
than standard in China, for example, the longest registration process should be 90
days [1], but it always needs more time, some product needs 18 months. It may be
too long to the medical device company, so that the company may lose market and
profit. And if the product cannot get approval, the company has to re-design the
product until it meets the SFDA's requirements, and re-apply for registration, which
may take more time and resource.
Therefore, a few small companies decided to manufacture and sell medical device
products without applying SFDA registration certificate. Actually, the hospitals
should not buy the medical devices without official certificate, but these unqualified
products were sold at very low prices or sold with bribe activities. Some small public
hospitals and private hospitals might buy these unsafe products to cut the expenses.
Therefore, the Europe medical device company that manufactured artificial heart
entered China market by an illegal way. The investigation found that someone started
up a medical device in China firstly. Then the domestic company imported artificial
heart from Europe to China. But the domestic company did not apply registration for
this artificial heart; this local company counterfeited a registration license for sale.
And in China, few consumers might check if the license was legal with the SFDA,
because it's hard to check the license. After the hospital in this case bought some
artificial heart, the company disappeared.
The foreign medical device company refused to answer any question.
After accident happened, the medical device company didn't respond for this accident.
They only said: "Please ask that hospital X." A lot of information was lost so that the
investigation could not find more inadequate actions. For example, did the company
know the product may cause death?
Reason for Flawed Control Action and Dys functional Interaction
Incorrect Metal Model:
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Although no evidence can verify the medical device company intended to deliver
illegal product to China. They claimed they did not know and please asked for the
hospital X. But investigation report found that the doctor A provided at least one
artificial heart to the hospital X. The doctor A was an employee of this medical device
company.
Obviously, same as the hospital, the company also believed if they did not report the
negative results to Chinese public and government, none might know the artificial
product was unsafe. And their reputation would not be decreased. In addition, medical
device company believed that the regulation system and supervision system in China
was not so good to discover their activities. Therefore, they could deny everything,
just like they did.
5.6.3 The SFDA, Medical Device Company and Hospital Loop
In Chinese medical device system, the SFDA is responsible for administration and
supervision for medical devices. In this accident, the SFDA was supposed to monitor
the medical device market, and remove unsafe product from the market.
State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA)
General information:
The State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) (Chinese: k 1 3M 0 1111
JA) is founded in 2003 on the basis of the State Drug Administration. The State Food
and Drug Administration is under the Ministry of Health, which is in charge of
comprehensive supervision on the safety management of food, health food, cosmetics
and medical device, and is the competent authority of drug regulation in mainland
China. The sections within the FDA responsible for medical device are Department
of Medical Devices Supervision, Bureau of Investigation & Enforcement,
National Institute for Food and Drug Control and Center for Medical Device
Evaluation. This thesis puts them together for analysis [4].
Role and Responsibilities:
Follow regulations and guidelines from the State Council and the MOH
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Firstly, SFDA is expected to follow regulations provided by the State Council and the
MOH, and draws up detailed regulations and standards to administrate and supervise
medical device. It's SFDA's responsibility to set requirements for all new medical
device applications and define the approval process for new medical device. The
regulation for registration was established in 2004 and every medical device since has
been the subject before commercialization. The SFDA provides guidance documents
for different types of new medical device applications on its website.
Provide administration and supervision system to prevent potential hazards.
Once an application has been submitted to the SFDA, it is SFDA's responsibility to
critically examine the applicant's claim that a medical device is safe for intended use
and to impartially evaluate the new medical device for safety and efficacy and
approve it for sale if deemed appropriate. The SFDA does not run the clinical trials
but sets the standards for the evidence required for a medical device's approval,
monitors the research and reviews the results from the company's data. If SFDA
considers that the medical device is effective and its health benefits outweigh the risks,
the medical device is approved.
The SFDA is responsible for overseeing the promotion of medical device and ensures
that promotional materials are not misleading or false. The SFDA has to review all the
material submitted by medical device companies and identify potential violations
such as advertisements minimizing the risks of a medical device and overstating a
medical device's safety and effectiveness.
The SFDA is in charge of post-marketing surveillance to identify adverse events that
were not detected during the initial approval process. The SFDA also collects notices
of adverse events in China mainland market and analyzes this event to publish new
regulation and standards to prevent potential hazards.
Remove unsafe products from China market
The SFDA has the power, and the responsibility, to remove a medical device from the
market if it discovers new information about the safety and effectiveness profile of the
medical device that may put the public at risk. At the same time, the SFDA needs to
publish the medical device that has high risk on its website for notification to public.
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Context in Which Decisions Were Made:
The authority of administration and supervision shifted many time between different
governmental departments so that the authority is complex
Because of historical and special reason, a few departments have been involved into
medical device administration and supervision. These departments have published
some regulations, laws and standards for medical device. After the SFDA was
established, it should be the only legal department that was in charge of medical
device. However, regulations, laws and standards enacted by pervious governmental
departments are still effective, and some of them conflict with and have higher power
than current regulations and standards established by the SFDA. Therefore, medical
device companies find that they are not sure which regulation they should follow
when they want to apply for product registration. For example, some cardiac
pacemaker products should be registered and get license from the SFDA, but the
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of P.R.C
has defined that if these products could not get a CCC certificate, they could not be
sold in China market even if the products had gotten approval at the SFDA.
Number and ability of employees was not good enough to provide thorough
supervision
According to the statistics, there were only 250 employees that had medical device
background in SFDA [16]. But there were over 13,600 types of medical device
companies and over 100,000 hospitals by end of year 2007. Obviously, the
professional staffs were not enough to take regular inspection to monitor so many
medical device products in the market. It still needs time to train enough qualified
professionals. Although the SFDA has defined many regulations and policies that
constraint illegal products and activities, it could not find all violations in a so
complex market.
Trusted information from the medical device company
As mentioned previously, clinical trials and other tests are done by the medical device
company manufacturing the medical device, there is no independent external group
that tests the medical device and the only information available to the SFDA at the
time of approval is the information from testing departments and medical device
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company. But no one can ensure that the technical testing work was quality enough.
The SFDA has to make decision whether provide license for the registration
application based on some unreliable technical review and evaluation. And because of
limited personnel and resource, more and more registration applications were
submitted, the review process was always much longer than standard. And no extra
safety study after medical device was approved although it's required in the rules.
Therefore, medical device companies always deliver the most favorable results to
SFDA to speed up the review process. This lack of transparency hinders the work of
the SFDA and puts the public at risk by hiding potentially important safety
information. Even if adverse event happened, the medical device companies always
tried to hide it.
Dysfunctional Interaction at this level:
Communication between the SFDA, the medical device company and the hospital
was obviously dysfunctional. The system constraints required the SFDA to remove
the unsafe medical device. But the medical device company did not apply for
registration and clinical test. The hospital did not tell the SFDA that they bought and
used an illegal product on patient.
Flawed or Inadequate Decision and Control Actions:
The SFDA did not remove unsafe product from market.
The system required the SFDA should remove unsafe products before the products
applied to human body. So it seems that the inadequate control action for the SFDA
was they failed to find an unsafe product and remove it. But the real inadequate
control action was the SFDA did not provide qualified administration and supervision
system, a subsystem in medical device system, to find potential risks. The following
discussion mainly focuses on the losses of the subsystem.
The SFDA didn't have enough professionals and could not provide effective
regulations and supervisions to constraint illegal activities.
As mentioned above, the human resource issue was a big trouble that SFDA was
facing. It was difficult to hire qualified professionals. Similar, it was hard to provide
professional training to its staff, because the medical device products were innovating
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too fast. As a result, sometimes the SFDA may approve medical device's registration
based on an assumption that the materials medical device company submitted were
correct.
Even though the SFDA had its technical center to evaluate medical device, the same
problem was that the SFDA could not ensure the quality of evaluation. The
unprofessional evaluation might fail to find potential defects. Secondly, it cannot
review all submissions thoroughly because of the volume of materials it receives and
that only a small portion of the required submissions of final promotional materials
were examined for potential violations.
The state SFDA could not provide oversight on activities of its regional branches
Although there are many regulations to constraint the medical device, a few products
are still trying to violate the regulations. The SFDA has required its branches to
conduct additional monitoring and surveillance to detect violations that could not be
identified through a review of submitted materials, but some provincial branches or
rural branches did not follow the requirement. Therefore many companies
counterfeited the SFDA license and sold unsafe products to consumers. The patients
might be exposed to the potential risks.
The state SFDA did not provide uniform management for its branches
Finally, the internal management of the SFDA was disordered. The SFDA didn't
provide a uniform standard and process for medical device registration. There were
more than 700 branches in China could handle medical device registration and
supervision. The problem was that the State SFDA only provided regulations, but did
not provide a uniform work standard and process for its branches. And the employees
in different level branches must have different capacity, which lead the different
results on the effectiveness of supervision [17]. Similar, the state SFDA could not
monitor the effectiveness of its 700 branches too, because of manpower pressure.
Therefore many medical device companies could maximize its profits by not
submitting registration application at a certain place and deliver unsafe products to
Chinese consumers. Like those companies, some hospitals bought illegal products
even if they knew the products were unsafe, because of some dirty trading. They
thought the SFDA could not find their illegal activities.
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Reason for Flawed Control Action and Dysfunctional Interaction
Incorrect Metal Model:
As a controller, the SFDA assumed regulations and supervision system was good to
prevent losses. Secondly, the SFDA assumed medical device companies should
follow the regulations and provide safe products to consumers. Thirdly, the SFDA
believed all products that had passed their evaluation to enter China market were safe.
Then, the SFDA assumed the hospitals should buy illegal products which had illegal
licenses issued by the SFDA. Finally, the SFDA assumed the adverse event report
channel was good.
5.6.4 Ministry of Health and Hospital Loop
Ministry of Health
General information:
The Ministry of Health (MOH; Chinese: JT i) of the Government of the People's
Republic of China is established in 1949, and MOH is an executive agency of the
state which plays the role of providing information, raising health awareness and
education, ensuring the accessibility of health services, and monitoring the quality of
health services provided to citizens and visitors in the mainland of the People's
Republic of China [6].
The Ministry of Healthcare also provides experts to investigate poisoning cases,
enforces food safety, medical device safety and hygiene inspections, and can order
local health departments to conduct investigations into food and medical product
quality violations. The Ministry of Health also oversees the State Food and Drug
Administration (SFDA), an agency that has studied and identified unsafe foods, drugs
and medical devices, and has helped local health authorities form policies and training
programs to combat unsafe food and medical production and handling practices. It
also cooperates and keeps in touch with other health ministries and departments,
including those of the special administrative regions, and the World Health
Organization (WHO).
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MOH is a big organization that is in charge of many affairs, this section mainly
focuses on its responsibilities that have relationship with hospitals and medical
devices.
Role and Responsibilities:
Provide regulations, standards, and provisions for healthcare providers and medical
devices.
MOH is expected to provide detailed regulations, standards and provisions to support
the State Council's regulation, and oversee the effectiveness of the regulation system.
Currently, the MOH was responsible for the administration and supervision for
hospitals, and the SFDA, part of the MOH, drew up the regulation or provision for
medical device, and supervised the China market.
The SFDA could publish regulation by itself, but the legal level was lower than the
regulation published by the MOH. So many regulations were published by the MOH
to improve the legal level. Certainly, the MOH has the power to approve or deny the
inadequate regulations from the SFDA. It's the MOH's responsibility that ensured the
regulations could protect people's health and lives.
Allocate health funds and resource according to health development plan
The MOH is expected to decide how to allocate and balance healthcare resources and
funds among public hospitals, urban and rural health centers, and CDCs. In addition,
the MOH has the power to define the regulations and policies about registration,
scope, medical device purchasing, and service prices for government fund hospitals.
The MOH also provided the license for medical professionals. A doctor could not
provide medical service if he or she did not have license from the MOH. Finally, it's
MOH's responsibility to oversee these hospitals and medical professional's activities.
Once the MOH found that any activity of hospital violated current regulations and
laws, the MOH could annul the hospital's qualification.
Context in Which Decisions Were Made:
The authority of administration and supervision of medical device shifted many time
between different governmental departments so that the authority is complex now
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As mentioned in previous part, during past 10 years, a special situation is that no
single agency is responsible for all medical device safety regulations and enforcement
in China, several government departments and ministries under the State Council
wants to be involved into medical device area. These include the Ministry of Health,
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine, the Ministry of Commerce, and the
Ministry of Science and Technology. And there is no clear hierarchy of agencies at
the local or national levels.
The MOH was supposed to oversee the all aspects of medical device safety
regulations and unify safety controls since 2008. However, the other national agencies
have continued to regulate and monitor some medical devices. This unclear division
of duties has created conflict and confusion when citizens have sought to complain or
a when major crisis needed to be resolved.
The MOH is responsible for drafting regulations, standards and policies, however, a
few staffs and decision makers were not familiar with the hospitals and medical
devices. The MOH could not build perfect regulation system to regulate and monitor
hospitals and medical devices. Furthermore, the evergrowing people's healthcare
requirement pushed the government to build more and more public hospitals, which
required a lot of funds and healthcare resource. But the funds and resources were
limited. The traditional way was that allocated more funds and resources to high level
hospitals in urban area. For some small hospitals, it's hard to get enough resources to
develop.
At the same time, more and more hospitals were building in China urban and rural
areas, and it became more difficulty for the MOH to evaluate potential risks, and
supervise the market.
Dysfunctional Interaction at this Loop:
The interaction between MOH and hospital was abnormal. It played a critical role in
the accident. According to the investigation report, the hospital X did not report its
illegal activities to the MOH. Same, the MOH did not provided oversight on the
hospitals. Both control and feedback were missing.
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Flawed or Inadequate Decision and ControlActions:
The MOH provided an ineffective oversight on activities of its local bureau.
The MOH has thousands of branches in all over China. The head of MOH flow down
regulations, standards and policies to its regional health branches. And those branches
report work performance to the head of MOH. Nevertheless, the transparency of some
branches was not so good. They didn't follow the orders from the head. In this
accident, the local bureau mentioned they did not know the illegal surgeries. They
only pointed out that's illegal after accident happened.
But the head of MOH usually have to trust reports from these branches, it's difficult
for the head of MOH to oversee so many branches' activities. The MOH could only
know they were not following regulations, unless accident happened and was reported.
For example, once a provincial health bureau received extra money from a hospital,
and approved some requests without evaluation as required, the head of MOH could
not know if none reported this bribe.
The MOH did not provide effective regulation system and oversight on hospital.
As discussion previously, it's MOH's responsibility to oversee the hospital. The
MOH had power to shut down hospital if the hospital violated regulations. However,
the regulation system might not be effective in this accident. Illegal artificial heart
was used; illegal foreign doctor was involved in surgery; few patients died after
surgery. The regulations did not let the hospital stop their illegal surgeries.
People were part of the system. Because of historical reason, there were few people
that have professional medical background worked for the MOH. Especially in some
regional health branches, the gap between professionals and freshmen was big. As a
result, the staffs could not take responsibilities to find unsafe hospital, illegal
professionals and unsafe products.
Reason for Flawed Control Action and Dys functional Interaction
Incorrect Metal Model:
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As a controller, the MOH assumed the regulations were good enough to prevent
potential losses; assumed supervision system can find all illegal hospitals; thought the
hospital could take its responsibilities; assume the patients could protect themselves.
Coordination among Multiple Controllers:
In this accident, the MOH was the controller for the hospital, and the SFDA was
responsible for the artificial heart. They should work together to monitor the usage of
medical device in hospital. But in this event, there was no coordination between them.
Up until now, the directly controllers and control loops has been analyzed. Fully
understanding the behavior at any level of the socio-technical control structure
requires analysis of higher level of the control structure.
The Higher Levels of Control:
5.6.5 The State Council and the MOH Loop
State Council
General Information
The State Council's full name is State Council of the People's Republic of China
(simplified Chinese: i which is largely synonymous with the Central People's
Government after 1954, is the highest executive organization of State power, as well
as the highest organization of State administration. It is chaired by the Premier and
includes the heads of each governmental department and agency. The premier and
other members of the State Council is nominated by the president, reviewed by the
NPC, and appointed and removed by the president [5].
In the politics of the People's Republic of China, the State Council directly oversees
the various subordinate People's Governments in the provinces, and in practice
maintains an interlocking membership with the top levels of the Communist Party of
China creating a fused center of power. The State Council is responsible for carrying
out the principles and policies of the Communist Party of China as well as the
regulations and laws adopted by the NPC. Under the current Constitution, the State
Council exercises the power of administrative legislation, the power to submit
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proposals, the power of economic and budget management, and other powers granted
by the NPC and its Standing Committee.
Role and Responsibilities:
Provide regulation and guidelines for medical device
It's the State Council's responsibility to provide regulations for medical device to
protect people's health and safety. This regulation should give clear definition about
administration, manufacturing, operation, and post-marketing. The State Council
should also provide legislative guidelines for subordinate departments, so that those
departments can publish provision for medical devices. At the same time, it is also
expected to provide legislative oversight on the effectiveness of the subordinate
departments, in particularly the MOH.
Ensure the MOH has enough funds
Furthermore, the State Council is expected to ensure that the MOH has enough
funding to operate independently. There were more than 13,600 medical device
companies and 100,000 healthcare providers in China, the MOH have to request a lot
of resource to operate and ensure the public's health and safety. And it is expected to
provide enough budgets for the MOH and MOHRSS. The MOH needs to allocate
healthcare budget to over 13,850 public hospitals, 80,500 urban and rural health
centers, and 3,585 Centers of Disease Control (CDCs) in China. Similarly, the
MOHRSS needs a lot of budget to cover 13.7 billion Chinese basic medical insurance.
Oversee the medical device system
In addition, it is State Council's responsibility to oversee the effectiveness of
regulations and activities of subordinate departments. It has the power to revise the
inadequate medical device regulations, elect and annul the management of
governmental departments, if they were not qualified to take responsibilities.
Context in Which Decisions Were Made
The State Council has part legislative power to define administrative regulations. It's
State Council's responsibility to ensure that regulation could be effective. However,
because of historical and special reasons, people who were in charge of regulations
might not have medical device background, so they might miss some key rules. As a
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result, the first version of regulation only included 6 chapters and 48 articles, was
established within 7 days by the State Council. Some of its definitions and rules could
not provide clear description for readers. For example, some Provincial Government
and the SFDA met a lot of problems when followed this regulation. For instance,
there was no clear definition about counterfeit and inferior medical device, and how
to punish them.
Resource pressure was a common issue that many governmental departments were
facing. The large population in China required a large amount of healthcare resource.
Currently, over 100,000 public healthcare providers need to get funds from the MOH.
However, China is a developing country, and government has to put funds to national
defense, infrastructure, public affairs, education, agriculture and healthcare areas. The
State Council had to balance the investment between them. Additionally, the MOH
need to recruit enough professionals with medical device background to build
regulation system for medical device and monitor the effectiveness of it.
Dysfunctional Interaction at this Loop:
The interaction in this loop was normal.
Flawed or Inadequate Decision and Control Actions:
The State Council provided a regulation that might be not good enough to prevent
accident.
As mentioned earlier, the current regulation was only 6 chapters that missing some
situation. The increasing adverse events have verified that the current regulation was
unable to prevent many losses associated with medical devices. However, the
regulation is still not revised now. The MOH and SFDA had to publish a lot of
provisions and notifications to prevent similar problems after adverse events
happened. It might be useful to prevent future accidents, but those provisions didn't
have a high level legislative position. The State Council should revise the current
regulation and make it better.
The State Council underfunded the MOH
Furthermore, the State Council underfunded the MOH. But it's not State Council's
fault to underfund the MOH. The main reason was that China is a developing country,
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and funds are insufficient, that is why State Council has to balance the funds between
defense, agriculture, education, healthcare and others. However, this situation is
improving. The State Council began to invest more money and resource to healthcare
area from year 2006.
Reason for Flawed Control Action and Dys functional Interaction:
Incorrect Mental Models:
The State Council thought each component in the system can take responsibilities and
assumed funds were enough for the MOH.
The safety control structure is a system for general medical device product. In this
thesis, the artificial heart event related controller has been analyzed. The further study
can be done to analyze other medical device products.
5.7 Summary of Causes of the Accident Based on CAST
Based on the above analysis, the main causes of this accident are summarized as
following:
The hospital
The patient did not insist on their rights.
The hospital provided unnecessary diagnosis and treatment plan.
The hospital took surgery that they did not get permission.
The hospital allowed illegal foreign doctors to provide medical service.
The hospital did not stop illegal activities.
The hospital did not report accident but hided it.
The medical device company
The medical device company exported product to a Chinese hospital without
permission. The goal was to do illegal clinical test in China. The clinical test was
complex and expensive in the Europe.
The SFDA
The SFDA did not remove unsafe product from market.
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The SFDA didn't have enough professionals and could not provide effective
regulations and supervisions to constraint illegal activities.
The MOH
The MOH provided an ineffective oversight on activities of its local bureau.
The MOH did not provide effective regulation system and oversight on hospital.
The State Council
The State Council provided a regulation that might be not good enough to prevent
accident.
The State Council underfunded the MOH
The investigation pointed out the hospital and unregistered artificial heart was root
cause of several deaths. But in the discussion above, more causes are found. The
context and the mental models when taking these actions help to explain the reasons
for these unsafe actions. The CAST provides deep insight to the flawed behavior of
the controllers of this system that contributed to the losses in the artificial heart event.
6 Recommendations
The goal of an accident analysis should not be just to address symptoms, to assign
blame, or to determine which group or groups are more responsible than others. How
to change or re-engineer the entire safety control structure in the most cost-effective
and practical way to prevent similar accident processes in the future is more important
than blaming certain persons [20].
A list of recommendations is resulted from the CAST analysis. The recommendations
are given for each controller.
The State Council
1) The State Council should provide national economic and social development plan
and national budget plan, which includes health development plan and budget.
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2) The State Council should provide efficacious regulation and supervision system to
make the governmental departments, healthcare providers and medical device
companies cannot violate.
a. The State Council should provide new regulations to system for
administration and supervision of medical device.
b. The State Council should provide clear official definition and explanation
for every regulation.
c. The State Council should give legislative power to the MOH.
d. The State Council should provide health guidelines to the MOH.
e. The State Council should reject and annul inadequate regulations,
provisions, and decisions.
f. The State Council should provide up-to-date regulations to fit for fast
developing healthcare industry.
g. The State Council should create oversight system to oversee the
effectiveness of regulation system and activities of the MOH, the SFDA
and other departments.
h. The State Council should create transparency rules so that the MOH, the
SFDA, hospitals, and medical device companies to disclose their works to
prevent corruptions.
i. The State Council should provide enough funds and resource to build this
system.
j. The State Council should create rules so that regulations system and
oversight system can work well.
3) The State Council should provide funds to the MOH.
a. Funds for operation.
b. Funds for healthcare providers.
Ministry of Health
4) Same as the State Council, the MOH should be involved into regulation and
supervision system building.
a. The MOH should provide detailed regulations into regulation system of
medical device.
b. The MOH should provide standards for hospitals, healthcare service, and
qualifications of healthcare professionals.
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c. The MOH should create efficacious regulations for administration and
supervision of hospitals, and healthcare professionals.
d. The MOH should oversee the effectiveness of regulations, policies, and
standards.
e. The MOH should create rules for internal management, for example, the
transparency between local health bureau and MOH; the qualification of
staffs and positions.
f. The MOH should oversee the activities of regional branches, the SFDA,
and the healthcare providers in China.
g. The MOH should recruit qualified staffs and provide adequate training.
h. The MOH should build adverse event reporting system and database for
public and provide easy access to check the qualification of hospitals and
medical devices.
5) The MOH should allocate healthcare resources and funds to national wide
hospitals according healthcare development plan.
a. The MOH should ensure the needs from hospitals are true and reasonable.
b. The MOH should ensure the funds are allocated as planning.
c. The MOH should ensure the funds can get to the hospital.
d. The MOH should oversee the spending of the funds.
The SFDA
6) The SFDA should be involved into regulation and supervision system building.
a. The SFDA should provide detailed and uniform provisions, policies, and
standards for detailed medical device products.
b. The SFDA should provide effective and uniform supervision to inspect
unsafe products before they enter market.
c. The SFDA should define the uniform qualifications for its positions and
hire qualified staffs to fill those positions.
d. The SFDA should ensure the regulations and supervision is implemented
as required.
e. The SFDA should build adverse event channel to incent consumers to
report unsafe products.
f. The SFDA should ensure the transparency between its branches and
medical device companies.
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7) The SFDA should build effective and uniform product review and evaluation
processes and standards for medical device registration.
8) The SFDA should ensure its branches have funds to operate.
Medical Device Company
9) The medical device company should follow China regulations, provisions, and
standards.
a. The medical device company should take enough internal testing and
clinical tries before products are delivered to market.
b. The medical device company should provide accurate and correct product
information to the SFDA and consumers.
c. The medical device company should take actions once an adverse event is
reported.
d. The medical device company should expose negative events that may
injure consumers.
e. The medical device company should refuse inadequate request from
consumers.
The Hospitals
10) The hospitals should follow regulations and standards.
a. The hospitals should only provide healthcare service they register.
b. The hospitals should hire qualified staffs as required.
c. The hospitals should buy medical device that has registration at the SFDA.
d. The hospitals should use medical device as product instruction.
e. The hospitals should provide effectiveness and side effect information to
the patients.
f. The hospitals should refuse inadequate request from patients.
g. The hospitals should report adverse event to the medical device company
and the MOH.
The recommendations are generated from the application of the CAST analysis.
These may be good and useful to generate the new system safety requirements and
constraints to improve safety. But how to implement the recommendations in China is
a new challenge. As mentioned above many times, China is a big country and has a
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large number of population, the relationship between stakeholders is very complex.
The safety control structure can only describe a general connection between them.
Some deep connections can be studied.
Compare with the former SFDA officer's conclusion. These are systemic issues,
beyond punishing a doctor or blaming on a product. If we do not change the systemic
issues, then similar problem will occur again and again. People's lives are still at risk.
7 Conclusion
With the development of Chinese economics, Chinese consumers begin to concern
healthcare safety. The traditional risk analysis tools such as FMEA, FTA and ETA
can provide a linear analysis to the technical system. But they are not applicable to
complex sociotechnical system when the hazards are resulted from policy and social
behaviors.
Unlike the popular safety tools, CAST provided more findings in the analysis of a
healthcare accident from a social-technical level. Along with the fast development of
the medical device, creating a completely safe healthcare system is impossible but
that does not mean that it is not important to learn from past mistakes and work to
improve the existing system.
This thesis focused on understanding the healthcare system and how the artificial
heart accident happened by first studying the system as a whole and outlining the
control structure that dictates the way safety is enforced. The second step was to
identify the main clusters of power (hospitals, patients, medical device company, the
SFDA, the MOH, the State Council...) and map the way they interact with each other.
Third, the relating controller of the system and its control loops were studied
individually to look for ways in which they violated their safety responsibilities and to
try to understand what motivated the controllers by recreating the environment in
which they operated at the time.
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Based on the CAST analysis, some recommendations that target the controllers were
given. However even those recommendations should not be expected to be enough to
protect the public in the long term. The healthcare system will keep evolving and new
medical devices for diagnosis and treatments will be innovated and bring new and
unknown risks. It is important to keep in mind that the system is constantly evolving
and that it is necessary to monitor each of the controllers adapts to new changes and
how they affect the system as a whole. It is only by proactively monitoring the
changes that future health safety problems can be prevented. Further studies can focus
on more complex medical device like CT scanner and MRI.
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